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APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
POINT I 
RULE 64D, PROVIDING FOR THE GAR-
NISHMENT OF CHOSES IN ACTION, IS 
SUFFICIENTLY BROAD TO ALLO'V GAR-
NISHMENT OF A CONTRACT CLAIM: UN-
1 
DER A POLICY OF INSURANCE WHETHER 
THAT POLICY BE FIRE INSURANCE, LIA-
BILITY INSURANCE OR ROBBERY INSUR-
ANCE. 
It is important to remember in this case that gar-
nishment is strictly a statutory proceeding under the 
laws of each state. This brings into interpretation 
U.C.A. 1953, Rule 64D, which, it is respectfully sub-
mitted, is one of the most liberal garnishment statutes 
to be found in the United States. In this respect, Utah 
has been a leader in the trend toward liberalization of 
garnishment statutes. 
Since Utah's garnishment statute is more liberal 
than any statute interpreted in the cases cited by the 
plaintiffs, it follows that this Court should be prepared 
to accept the rationale of those cases cited by the plain-
tiffs. 
The defendant attempted to distinguish Ackerman 
v. Tobin, 22 F. 2d 541 (8th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 
276 U.S. 628, 72 L. Ed. 739, 48 S. Ct. 321 (1928), 
where the court held that an unliquidated contract claim 
under a property (robbery) insurance policy was sub-
ject to garnishment, by referring to fire insurance cases 
and then attempting to distinguish the latter from lia-
bility insurance. The defendant's citation of 6 Am. J ur. 
2d 679 and the analogy between fire and robbery in-
surance are very appropriate; however, the distinction 
drawn by the defendant at page 29 of his brief (which 
followed some illogical reasoning taken from the iso-
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lated Tennessee case of Gray v. Houck, 167 Tenn. 
233, 68 S. ,V. 2d ll 7 ( 1934) is clearly untenable. 
In Finch v. Great Anierican Ins. Co., 101 Conn. 
332, 125 A. 628, 629, 38 A.L.R. 1068 (1924), the 
question arose as to whether, under the standard form 
of fire insurance policy, "a debt is due" from the under-
writer to the insured within the meaning of the Con-
necticut foreign attachment statute after a loss by fire 
but before proof of loss. The loss was not payable until 
60 days after notice, ascertainment, estimate and satis-
factory proof of loss. Furthermore, the policy provided 
that no suit or action could be maintained against the 
insurer until the insured had complied with all policy 
prov1s1ons. 
In allowing garnishment by the plaintiff the Su-
preme Court of Errors said: 
"A policy of fire insurance is an agreement to 
indemnify the insured against loss by fire to the 
property insured. Before any loss, and while the: 
policy remains in force, the liability of the under-
writer is contingent. 'Vhen, as here, the policy 
is in force at the time of a loss by fire which is 
covered by the policy, the contingent liability 
of the underwriter is thereby converted into a 
present contract obligation to pay whatever sum, 
not exceeding the amount of the policy, will in 
fact indemnify the insured; payment being neces-
sarily def erred until the amount of the loss is 
ascertained. 
"In the standard form of fire insurance policy, 
the required process of liquidating the loss is 
3 
minutely specified, with reference to protecting 
the company against excessive or fraudulent 
claims; and the tiling of proofs of loss by the 
insured is one step in that process. A failure to 
do so within the time limited may bar the en-
forcement of the underwriter's obligation, be-
cause it is so agreed in the policy; but the obli-
gation itself is manifestly (Teated by the promise 
to pay in case of a loss by fire, and by the hap-
pening of that contingency. The steps which 
the insured is required by the policy to take, 
before he can collect or sue for the loss, relate 
to matters, the performance of which is exclu-
sively within the Yolition of the insured. In 
effect, he is required to furnish a bill of particu-
lars in support of his claim. This is not with a 
view to creating a debt; on the contrary, the 
filing of proof of loss necessarily involves the 
assertion by the insured of the existence of an 
antecedent debt. So the provisions of the policy 
requiring the filing of proofs of loss tacitly as-
sume the existence of an obligation to indemnify. 
The whole procedure after the loss is for the 
purpose of finding out whether the claimed obli-
gation to indemnify has arisen, and, if so, to 
ascertain its amount." 
Garnishment has similarly been allowed in other 
jurisdictions. In Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Citizens' Bank, 
166 Ark. 551, 266 S.W. 675, 39 A.L.R. 1458, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court allowed garnishment of a 
claim under a fire insurance policy even though the 
proceeds were not yet payable. Also, in Brainard v. 
Rogers, 74 Cal. App. 247, 239 P. 1095 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1925), under an insurance policy providing that no 
action could be maintained by the insured against the 
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insurer until after proof of loss had been filed, and 
interpreting the narrow California statute, the issue 
was resolved against the garnishee. 
"The sole question which is in issue on tLc 
appeal is: Are the proceeds of a fire insurance 
policy subject to garnishment at the instance of 
the creditor of the insured subsequent to a fire 
loss, but prior to an adjustment of that loss be-
tween the insurer and the insured? Our answer 
to this question is in the affirmative for the rea-
sons which will follow." 
The defendant would distinguish these cases by 
asserting that an obligation exists under a fire insur-
ance policy when the fire occurs, but that no obligation 
exists under a liability insurance policy until the liability 
of the insured has been established by judgment or 
agreement. This position is patently untenable for the 
reasons which will follow. 
The rationale of the Finch case, supra, dealing with 
fire insurance is clearly applicable to the case at bar. 
The literal language of that case is appropriate when 
applied to the facts at hand. In both instances all events 
which would create liability occur at the time of the 
loss. The whole procedure after the loss is for the pur-
pose of finding out whether the claimed liability of the 
insurer has arisen, and, if so, to ascertain its amount. 
The plaintiffs merely desire to follow this procedure, 
and for so doing they should not be precluded by the 
argument that no obligation exists under a liability 
msurance policy until the liability of the insured has 
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been established. The defendant obviously begs the 
question in his attempt to create a narrow and unreal-
istic distinction wholly inconsistent with modern legal 
trends involving motor vehicles and a mobile popu-
lation. 
The issue m this case is identical to that in the 
property insurance cases previously cited: Does an 
insurance contract provide a res which is capable of 
supporting a garnishment lien after all facts which 
would create liability have occurred? The question 
must be answered in the affirmative regardless of the 
nature of the insurance contract. The required process 
of liquidating the loss is minutely specified in the stand-
ard form of insurance policy in order to protect the 
insurance company against excessive, fraudulent or 
spurious claims. The reason for this process will not 
be defeated by allowing the plaintiffs to establish a 
lien by garnishment. All defenses which the insurance 
company had would still be available subsequent to 
garnishment. This applies to both property and liability 
insurance. In the property insurance cases the courts 
have indicated that subsequent to garnishment the 
underwriter's obligation may be barred by some defense 
such as fraud, arson, failure to give notice, failure to 
make proof of loss, failure to make an adjustment or 
liquidate, or exercise of the insurer's option to replace 
the property. Likewise, in the liability, insurance cases, 
the plaitniff's claim is subject to the defenses of con· 
tributary negligence, fraud, etc. In fact, the Utah 
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Safety Responsibility Act has eliminated some of the 
defenses in liability insurance cases. 
It is respectfully submitted that under Utah's 
broad garnishment statute no reason can be found for 
distinguishing between property and liability insurance 
as to the availability of a res subject to garnishment. 
Consequently, the subject insurance contract is subject 
to garnishment in this case. 
POINT II 
THE GARNISHEE'S ANSWER TO PLAIN-
TIFFS' INTERROGATORIES SH 0 'VE D 
THAT THE GARNISHEE HAD PERSONAL 
PROPERTY IN ITS POSSESSION OR UNDER 
ITS CONTROL BELONGING TO THE DE-
FENDANT; THEREFORE, THE PLAIN-
TIFFS 'VERE NOT REQUIRED TO REPLY 
TO THE GARNISHEE'S ANS-\VER. 
The defendants assert that the plaintiffs are pre-
cluded from questioning the correctness of the gar-
nishee's answer to interrogatories by failure to reply 
to such answer. In support of this contention the de-
fendants quote from U.C.A. 1953, Rule 64 D (i). How-
ever, the defendants' quotation ends short of the ap-
plicable sentence. 
" ... If such answer shmn; that the garnishC:"e 
has personal property of any kind in his pos-
session or under his control belonging to th~ 
defendant, the Court shall enter judgment ~hat 
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the garnishee <leli,'er the same to the sheriff, 
and if the plaintiff recovers Judgment against 
the defendant in the action, such property or 
so much thereof as may be necessary shall be 
sold upon execution, and the proceeds applied 
toward the satisfaction of such judgment, to-
gether with the costs of the action and proceed-
ings." (Emphasis added) . 
This sentence becomes the relevant portion of the 
subparagraph when considered in the light of the 
answer to interrogatory No. 4. To that interrogatory 
the garnishee answered in the affirmative that there 
was in effect at the time of the accident a policy of 
liability insurance covering the vehicle driven by the 
defendant Cox. By answering this specific interrogatory 
in the affirmative the garnishee has, as a matter of law, 
admitted that a chose in action exists. The garnishee's 
contrary answer to the general interrogatory (No. 2) 
was merely an erroneous interpretation of law which 
would obviously be contested by plaintiffs if The 
Travelers Insurance Company had sought any judg-
ment. The plaintiffs are not to be bound by such an 
erroneous interpretation of law. 
Furthermore, the sentence quoted by defendants 
from subparagraph ( i) of Rule 64 D indicates that 
judgment may be entered upon the answer in favor of 
the garnishee and defendant. However, neither the 
garnishee, The Travelers Insurance Company, nor 
defendant Cox, has moved for an entry of jud,qment 
thereon. The plaintiffs are not precluded thereby and 
remain free to issue another garnishment in the same 
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matter if they so desire. :Further, Cox could never 
secure a judgment-nor would he attempt to do so, 
since such attempt would constitute a general appear-
ance on his part. In this respect, it is interesting to note 
that no attempt is being made in this appeal to have 
the garnishee represented (as can be seen from the 
caption of respondent's brief). 
POINT III. 
THE QUASHING OF SUMMONS SERVED 
ON COX IN MARYLAND, BASED UPON 
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS, WAS 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The defendant Cox openly admits in his brief (p. 
4) that his motion, which was granted by Judge Ander-
son, to quash service of summons was based upon the 
proposition that he was being deprived of his property 
without due process of law, contrary to Section 7, 
Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah and 
contrary to Amendment XIV to the Constitution of 
the United States. That basis for granting the motion 
was clearly erroneous, for the United States Supreme 
Court has sanctioned the procedure whereby construc-
tive service or personal service in a foreign state can 
be used to obtain in rem jurisdiction, allowing the 
plaintiff to proceed in the main action against property 
of the defendant in the hands of a third party. Chicago 
R.R. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710, 19 S. Ct. 797 (1899); 
Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 25 S. Ct. 625 (1905). 
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The defendant's contention that Penrnoyer v. Neff, 95 
U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 ( 1877), prohibits a determi-
nation of personal liability when personal service is not 
made within the State is not contested; however, under 
this theory the plaintiff's are proceeding only against 
a policy of liability insurance as a res; there is no per-
sonal liabilty involved. 
The question involved in this case is the availability 
of a res subject to garnishment. The constitutional ques-
tion would arise only if it were to be determined that 
no res existed. However, Judge Jeppson ruled that a 
res did exist which could be reached by plaintiffs to 
acquire in rem jurisdiction (R. 60-61). 
Furthermore, Judge J eppson's ruling that a chose 
in action existed which could be the subject of an in rem 
proceeding was tied to the ruling as to the nature of 
the appearance. Judge Jeppson's ruling that the ap-
pearance was special was specifically dependent upon 
considering the action to be one in rem. This was made 
evident by the Order (R. 61) : 
" ... such appearance did not constitute a 
general appearance since the aforesaid ruling of 
the court that in rem jurisdiction can be had 
therein is considered by the Court to be a special 
appearance." (Emphasis added) . 
This correlative treatment of the two issues by 
Judge Jeppson points out the inconsistency in the 
defendant's position. Nevertheless, the defendant sought 
to overturn Judge J eppson's ruling on only one of the 
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mutually dependent issues. Judge J eppson's thinking 
was that since in rem jurisdiction could be had then 
the defendant Cox would be considered to have made 
a special appearance, but if no chose in action existed, 
then the action could not be in rem and Cox would have 
made a general appearance inasmuch as he appeared 
in resistance to a Motion to Amend the Complaint. 
Again we come back to the question of the availability 
of a res subject to garnishment. 
It appears from the defendant's brief that he did 
not consider the action to be in rern, as did Judge 
Jeppson, but rather a personal action against a non-
resident of the State of Utah. This basic faulty thinking 
on the part of the defendant has permeated the entire 
record and the Respondent's brief (P. 12) wherein 
he contends: 
" ... Cox's attorney appeared to resist the 
proposed Amendment ... on the ground (that) 
Cox had no property in the State of Utah which 
could be made the subject of an in rem proceed-
ing. The substance of the appearance was to re-
sist jurisdiction over the person of Cox." 
The two sentences of the fore going argument are 
clearly contrary positions. The only possible meaning 
which can be derived from the statement is that Cox 
was claiming that plaintiffs were seeking " ... a per-
sonal judgment ... under the label of an 'in rem 
theory' ... " (Resp. Br. 30). Appellants have con-
sistently pointed out that they are not proceeding in 
personam; rather, they are proceeding only against the 
res. 
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On page 13 of his brief, the defendant gives his 
ground for making the motion to quash service of 
summons (which was granted by Judge Anderson) as 
being that" ... the court did not have jurisdiction over 
his person ... " (Emphasis added) . Furthermore, the 
defendant repeatedly cites Pennoyer v. Neff, supra, 
for the proposition that extra-territorial service of pro-
cess will not confer jurisdiction which will support a 
personal judgment. 
That the service of summons upon Cox in Mary-
land was pursuant to an in rem action is obvious from 
the Summons. The Summons informs Cox that a policy 
of liability insurance issued by The Travelers Com-
pany would be garnished and that-
" . . . Proceedings thereunder will be had 'in 
rem', and your rights under said policy, and the 
liabilities of the insurer to you concerning those 
rights, will be garnished and attached." 
In other words, the Summons made it abundantly 
clear that the plaintiffs were proceeding against The 
Travelers Insurance Company's obligation to pay under 
the liability insurance policy. The plaintiffs are not 
proceeding against property held in the possession of 
Cox, but rather property in the possession of The 
Travelers Insurance Company. This in rem action is 
not an attempt to make an attachment of transitory, 
intangible property in the possession of Cox, but rather 
effectuates a garnishment of the obligation held by The 
Travelers Insurance Company. 
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The plaintiff's course of action under Count II of 
the Amended Complaint is the same as that used by 
the plaintiffs in Ackerman v. Tobin, supra; Finch v. 
Great American Ins. Co., supra; Brainard v. Rogers, 
supra; and Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Citizens' Bank, 
supra. In those cases the plaintiffs garnished the under-
writers' obligations under insurance contracts and con-
structively served the non-resident defendants, thereby 
creating in rem jurisdiction. The constructive service 
in those cases did not create in pers<mam jurisdiction, 
but rather gave the defendants notice that obligations 
due them from the insurance companies had been gar-
nished and were subject to being taken in satisfaction 
of the plaintiffs' claims. 
In those cases the garnishee-insurance companies 
objected to the garnishment on grounds similar to those 
used by defendant Cox in the case at bar, i.e., no obli-
gation was due and owing the defendant by the gar-
nishee at the moment of garnishment. The garnishees 
in the cited cases attempted to secure judgments in 
their favor against the plaintiffs just as Utah Rule 
64D (i) provides. Those judgments would not have 
settled the conflicts between plaintiffs and defendants, 
but merely those between plaintiffs and garnishees as 
to the existence of a res sufficient to support a garnish-
ment lien. However, in all of those cases the garnishees 
were unsuccessful in their attempts to defeat in rem 
jurisdiction. As has been previously mentioned in this 
brief, The Travelers Insurance Company took no action 
towards the entry of a judgment in its favor in this case. 
lJ 
As will be carefully noted, the objections in the 
cited cases were made by the garnishee-insurance com-
panies, whereas, in the case before this Court, the objec-
tion was (as appears from the face of the record) made 
by the defendant Cox. In fact the objection made by 
defendant Cox went to a matter clearly separate and 
distinct from the possession of a res by the garnishee. 
As previously mentioned, Cox filed a Motion to Dis-
miss the Amended Complaint on the ground that the 
Court did not have jurisdiction over his person and con-
sequently would be depriving him of his constitutional 
rights since The Travelers Insurance Company had 
no obligation then due to him. Cox undoubtedly had a 
right to attempt to quash the service of summons but 
not on the ground he used-namely, that no property 
existed which could be the subject of an in rem action. 
If Cox had no property as he asserts, then why should 
he be concerned about its disposition? Why should he 
bother to appear in court to protect his non-existent 
property? 
The truth of the matter is that The Travelers 
Insurance Company is, and has been, the party con-
cerned with the existence of a res subject to garnish-
ment. It is The Travelers Insurance Company that 
would normally object to the garnishment on the basis 
that it was not obligated to Cox-not Cox who would 
object to an obligation owed him by Travelers. Yet, 
The Travelers Insurance Company has not sought a 
judgment against the plaintiffs, nor has it sought any 
order. As a matter of fact, The Travelers Insurance 
14 
Company has made no appearance save to answer the 
garnishment interrogatories. The Travelers Insurance 
Company has not even appended its name to the Re-
spondent's Brief. 
Therefore, the only effective Order that Judge 
Anderson could, or in fact did, issue was one quashing 
personal service upon Cox. Judge Anderson made it 
abundantly clear on May 25, 1964 (R. 62-63), that he 
would not reverse the prior order of Judge Jeppson 
involving the same matters of law and fact (See App. 
Br. 10). Judge Jeppson's prior order (R. 60-61) had 
emphatically stated that Cox had a chose in action under 
a liability insurance policy which could be reached by 
the plaintiffs to acquire in rem jurisdiction. 
Thus, the order of Judge Jeppson that a chose 
in action existed which was subject to garnishment 
still exists as a viable and enforceable order-and Cox 
has not appealed from that Order! The case is conse-
quently still at issue since The Travelers Insurance 
Company has obtained no judgment relieving it of 
liability as garnishee. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that an insurance con-
tract does provide a res which is subject to garnishment 
as a chose in action under Rule 64D. The attachment 
of such a chose in action in the possession of a garnishee 
creates no personal liability, and is therefore consti-
tutionally valid. 
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The extensive argument relating to garnishment 
of the insurer's obligation under a liability insurance 
contract should not be considered to detract from the 
viability of the other two points made by these appel-
lants. This emphasis has been necessitated by the re-
spondent's failure to squarely face the real issue involved 
and the nationwide importance of that issue being 
soundly and realistically decided in this case. 
It is also strongly contended by the appellants with 
equal sincerity that (I) defendant Cox's appearance 
before Judge Jeppson on November 6, 1963, waived his 
objection to personal jurisdiction and constitutes a 
general appearance, and ( 2) the Order granting sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendant Anaconda Com-
pany on the merits of the controversy is unsupportable 
under the facts and the record before this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER and 
WILFORD A. BEESLEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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